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In many developed countries, budgetary pressures have made government investigate 
private insurance to reduce pressure on their public health system. Between 1997 and 
2000 the Australian government implemented a series of reforms intended to increase 
enrollment in private health insurance and reduce public health care costs. Using the ABS 
2001 National Health Survey, we examine the impact of increased insurance coverage on 
use of the hospital system, in particular on public and private admissions and lengths of 
stay. We model probability of hospital admission and length of stay for public (Medicare) 
and private patients. We use Propensity Score Matching to control for selection in the 
insurance decision and estimate a two-part model for hospital admission and length of 
stay on the matched sample. Our results indicate that there is selection associated with 
insurance choice. We also find that unconditional public patient and private patient 
lengths of stay in 2001 differ markedly depending on insurance duration. Those with 
shorter periods of insurance coverage behave more like the uninsured than those insured 
prior to the insurance incentives. While the insurance incentives substantially increased 
the proportion of the population with supplementary cover, the impact on use of the 
public system appears to be quite modest. Increased private usage outweighs reduced 
public usage and the insurance incentives appear to be an extremely costly way of 
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1. Introduction 
In many countries, budgetary pressures have made government investigate private health 
insurance as a means to reduce pressure on their public health system (OECD 2004). The options 
available to increase demand for privately funded health care and the effect on demand for public 
services depend on the extent of health cover provided by the public system, interactions between 
the public and private systems, and the role of private insurance which all vary across countries. 
Private insurance may cover services or individuals excluded from the public system (US, 
Netherlands and Germany), co-payments associated with universal public services (France), 
services not provided publicly (Canada and Switzerland), or duplicate private provision of 
services provided by the public system (UK, Australia, Ireland and New Zealand). Many countries 
have a mix of roles for supplementary private health insurance depending upon population 
subgroups or specific forms of care. 
Public policy plays an important role in private insurance markets. Policies that restrict benefits, 
payments, provider networks and eligibility under the public system, drive demand for 
supplementary private insurance and influence the characteristics of those privately insured. For 
example, in countries with extensive public provision, it is not surprising to find a smaller 
proportion of the population with supplementary cover. Regulation of the supplementary market 
can encourage or discourage the purchase of private coverage. For example, policies offering the 
opportunity to opt-out of the public system may increase the size of private insurance market and 
use of the private health system; subsidies to private insurance or private provision can also 
potentially reduce the demand for public health care.  
In Australia a universal public health care system, Medicare, was introduced in 1984. 
Subsequently the private health insurance coverage of the population fell steadily reaching its 
lowest level of just over 30% in 1998. This lead to a number of government initiatives designed to 
increase coverage and relieve pressure on the public hospital system by diverting hospital use 
from the public to the private system. In 1997 the government introduced a private insurance tax 
rebate for low income singles and families and a tax surcharge, of 1% of taxable income, for those 
on high incomes. The size of the rebate varied with the extent of cover (hospital and/or ancillary 
insurance) and with family size. The tax surcharge could be avoided by purchasing private health 
insurance. In 1999, the income-tested rebate was replaced with a constant 30% premium rebate, 
available to all regardless of income. In 2000 the third insurance incentive introduced an age 
gradient into the premium schedule. After July 15, 2000 all new enrollees aged over 30 pay a 
premium loading in future period of two percent for each year of age over 30 at entry. The loading 
is capped at 70 percent. Irrespective of age, people already insured prior to the deadline who 
maintain their cover are exempt from the loading. The 2000 reform was accompanied by extensive 
publicly-funded advertising under the theme “Run for Cover”. As a result of the insurance 
incentives, private insurance coverage in Australia increased from 30.1 percent in 1998 to 43 
percent in 2000, a jump of nearly 50 percent, most of which occurred just prior to July 2000.  
There was also a change in the mix of the insured population with large fall in the percentage aged 
over 65 (Ellis and Savage, 2005).  
This paper addresses a number of health policy questions. To what extent have the incentives for 
supplementary private insurance reduced public usage and thus reduced the demand for scarce 
public resources? What has been the impact on the private usage? Have the insurance incentives 
been a cost-effective way to relieve pressure on the public system? Using the 2001 Australian 
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National Health Survey (NHS), we model probability of hospital admission and length of stay for 
public and private patients.  To control for selection in the insurance decision, we use Propensity 
Score Matching (PSM) and model hospital admission and length of stay using two part estimation.  
We determine how predicted unconditional lengths of stay vary with insurance status and 
duration, and compare the results from the matched and original datasets. We find that insurance 
choice is affected by the existence of selection.   
In terms of hospital use, either as a Medicare or private patient, the newly-insured do not, at least 
in the short term, act like the long-term insured. They use the public hospital system more than the 
long-term insured and, compared with the uninsured, their increased private usage outweighs 
reduced public usage. The insurance incentives increased the proportion of the population with 
private cover substantially, but the impact on use of the public system appears to be less 
pronounced. Our results indicate that the incentives were a very expensive way to reduce pressure 
on the public system.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes the literature on the association between 
supplementary insurance and health service use. Section 3 reviews the role of supplementary 
health insurance, government intervention in private health insurance market, as well as the public 
and private hospital system in Australia. Data used for this study and descriptive statistics are 
described in Section 4.  Section 5 discusses empirical strategies.  Results are presented in Section 
6 and section 7 concludes the study. 
2. Health insurance and hospital utilization in Australia 
The Australian Medicare system provides universal, tax-financed assistance for health care. It 
provides free treatment in a public hospital anywhere in Australia. It also subsidises GP and 
specialist consultations, medical services provided to private inpatients and drugs listed on the 
Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme. Medicare reimburses 85% and 75% of the set fee on the 
Medical Benefits Schedule for outpatient and private inpatient medical services, respectively. 
Except for salaried doctors in public hospitals, doctors set their own fees and patients face out-of-
pocket costs arising from gaps between the fee charged and the Medicare reimbursement, as well 
as from hospital charges for private treatment, and prescription co-payments (Hall and Savage, 
2005).  
Public patients treated in public hospitals forego choice of medical provider and are treated by 
specialists paid by the hospital. These specialists may be private practitioners, paid on a sessional 
basis or salaried staff specialists who are hospital employees but who also have rights to admit 
private patients. Waiting times for free treatment as a Medicare patient vary considerably 
depending on procedure. 
Private health insurance in Australia is limited to covering private inpatient treatment in either a 
public or private hospital, to some portion of out-of-pocket medical gap for private in-hospital 
treatment, prostheses and devices provided to private in-patients, and to ancillary services such as 
dental and optical care, physiotherapy, chiropractic treatment and acupuncture. Hospital and 
ancillary insurance may be purchased separately although a majority of the insured population has 
both hospital and ancillary cover. Annual premiums vary depending upon the extent of cover, the 
front-end deductible and the state of residence. All applicants for a policy must be accepted by the 
fund and, prior to 2000, the premium charged for a policy could not vary by age, health status or 
any other personal characteristic.  
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Prior to the insurance incentives the private hospital sector was growing, despite the declining 
private insurance coverage of the population. During the ten years to 1996-97, the private hospital 
share of acute hospital admissions had been increasing at almost double the rate of public 
admissions and private bed-days at eight times the public growth rate (Hall and Savage, 2005). 
The private hospital share continued to increase after the implementation of the insurance 
incentives; between 1997-98 and 2001-02, total private hospital admissions increased by 7.9% per 
year compared with 1.3% for public hospital admissions. However the extent to which this can be 
attributed to the incentives is not clear from the aggregate data; in the three years prior to the 
commencement of the insurance incentives, the annual average growth rate for private admissions 
was also high at 7.1%.  
3. Literature on supplementary private insurance and health utilization 
There is a growing literature on the links between private cover and utilisation of the health 
system.  Cutler and Zeckhauser (2000) provide a broad overview of the literature on the demand 
for health insurance.  Studies in the US mainly focus on the evidence from the Medigap program, 
which provides supplementary coverage for Medicare patients (those aged over 65).  For example, 
Ettner (1997) estimates a logit model of supplementary insurance and two-part models of US 
Medicare utilisation and expenditures using the 1991 Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey. For 
the supplementary insurance decision she finds modest but mixed evidence of self-selection on the 
basis of observed health status and strong wealth effects. Those who purchase their supplementary 
insurance as individuals are found to have higher total and physician expenditures than those with 
employer-provided policies.  
In the UK about 14% of the population has private cover. Using several years of the British Social 
Attitudes Survey, Besley, Hall and Preston (1999) find that the demand for private health 
insurance is related to barriers to public care such as waiting time and that private coverage is 
associated with higher socio-economic status. They argue that individuals who opt out of public 
sector treatment free up resources for those who rely exclusively on the public system, although 
high-income individuals who are privately insured continue to use the National Health Service for 
a large array of treatments. Using the British Household Panel Survey, Propper (2000) finds finds 
considerable movement between the public and private sectors, revealing a complex relationship 
between public and private sector use. 
In Ireland, private insurance coverage increased from 15% to about 40% between 1970 and 2000, 
despite increased access to public care, annual premium increases and reduced tax relief. Harmon 
and Nolan (2001) examine this growth and jointly estimate the insurance and the utilisation of 
inpatient hospital services using data from the 1994 Living in Ireland Survey. Treating insurance 
as exogenous, they find that private cover increases utilisation by about 3%; this increases to 6% 
when the insurance decision is treated as endogenous.  
In France, public coverage is universal but incomplete and most people (85%) have 
supplementary insurance to lower out-of-pocket costs. Using data from the 1998 Enquete sur la 
sante et la protection sociale, Buchmueller et al. (2004) find no evidence that sicker people 
purchase more cover.  Despite this, supplementary insurance is found to have a large and 
statistically significant effect on the probability of a physician visit.  
In Catalonia Spain, the public national health system coexists with a developing supplementary 
private system.  Using a representative survey from Catalonia, Costa-Font and Font-Vilalta (2004) 
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simultaneously model the use of the NHS and demand for private insurance and find that private 
cover lowers the use of publicly provided primary and specialized services. 
Using data from 4 waves of the European Community Household panel, Jones, Koolman and van 
Doorslaer (2004) estimate the impact of private health insurance on specialist visits in Ireland, 
Portugal, Italy, Spain and the UK. They find that private cover increases with income and 
sometimes with better self-reported health status, and that private cover increases the probability 
of a specialist visit. 
In Australia, factors influencing the demand for private insurance coverage have been examined 
using data from the National Health Surveys undertaken by the Australian Bureau of Statistics. 
Using 1989 and 1995 NHS data respectively, Savage and Wright (2003) and Barrett and Conlon 
(2003) find a strong association between demand for insurance and income. Savage and Wright 
also examine the association between utilisation and insurance for private hospital length of stay.  
They find that insurance can more than double the average length of private hospital stay. In this 
paper, we focus on the impact of insurance and insurance duration on public and private hospital 
use in the period following the introduction of the insurance incentives.   
4. Data and descriptive results 
We use the NHS 2001 to study the impacts of the private insurance reforms on public and private 
hospital treatment. The survey is a representative household survey and provides a rich source of 
data on demographics and household composition, employment, risk-related behaviours, long-
term conditions, insurance status and use of the health system. It is a representative sample of 
17,918 private dwellings across Australia and has data on 26,862 individuals. Within each 
household there is data on one adult (> age 18), all children aged 0 – 6 years, and one child aged 
7-17 years. For this study, we restrict our sample to non-dependent individuals aged 18 or more, 
leaving a sample of 17,694 individuals across Australia.  
A key variable in the data relates to the duration of private insurance cover for those currently 
insured at the time of the survey. Starting from 1997, the Australian government imposed a series 
of incentive policies to encourage the uptake of private insurance.  Figure 1 shows the insurance 
coverage of the population between 1983 and 2004. The dashed vertical lines indicate the timing 
of the insurance incentives implemented in 1997, 1999, and 2000. The shaded area shows the 
period over which the NHS 2001 survey was undertaken.  
Figure 1 near here 
Using data on time of purchase of insurance, we create five duration dummies: five or more years 
(dge5); two to less than five years ago (d2tolt5); one to less than two years (d1tolt2); less than one 
year (dlt1); and not insured (d0).  These dummies capture not only how long ago an individual 
took up private insurance, but are also indicative of whether her/his decision to purchase the 
private insurance was potentially influenced by one of the government incentives.  For example, 
those who have had private insurance cover for five or more years, the “long-term insured”, 
purchased private insurance before the Australian government implemented the incentive policies.  
Those who have held private insurance for less than five years are the “newly-insured”.  Among 
this group, those who have had private insurance for two to five years were likely to be influenced 
by the government 1997 incentive policy; and less than two years by some combination of the 
1999 private insurance rebate and the 2000 “Run for Cover” policy.    
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For each individual, the NHS provides data on hospital admissions in last 12 months.  We also 
know their patient status at the most recent admission – Medicare if they chose to be admitted as a 
public patient and face no out-of-pocket costs; or private if they chose to be admitted as a private 
patient and fund their treatment by some combination of private insurance and out-of-pocket 
costs. There is also data on length of most recent hospital stay. 
Figure 2 near here 
Figure 2 shows the data structure of the sample to be analysed. Of the sample, 47% have private 
cover and two thirds of these were insured more than five years. Most of the new enrolees 
obtained cover during the later years of the insurance reforms. Irrespective of insurance status, 
about 14.5% were admitted to hospital in the last 12 months. Interestingly, insurance status 
influences but does not wholly determine patient status when admitted to hospital; of privately 
insured hospitalised individuals, 22% choose to be public patients and of uninsured hospitalised 
individuals, about 12% choose to be private patients.  
Table 1 near here 
Table 1 presents means for demographic variables, educational qualifications, income of the unit, 
location, self-reported health status, risk factors and prevalence rates of a large array of long term 
health conditions for the full sample and also broken down by insurance status. Table 1 also 
presents tests of difference between means for the two insurance groups. To determine whether 
observed characteristics are significantly different between these two groups, t-tests are used for 
continuous variables and chi-square tests for binary variables; p-values of these tests are presented 
in the final column of the table. For most covariates, there is a significant difference between the 
insured and uninsured groups (p<0.01). Relative to the uninsured, those with supplementary 
insurance are more likely to be middle-aged and married, more highly educated, with higher 
family income, less eligible for additional health care assistance and more likely to reside in 
capital cities. Where there are significant differences in the prevalence of long term conditions, the 
insured tend to have lower incidence. They also have better self-reported health, are more likely to 
exercise and much less likely to be a regular smoker. 
Focusing on those who were hospitalized in the last year, we distinguish four groups: a) those with 
private hospital coverage treated as Medicare patient; b) those with private hospital coverage 
treated as private patient; c) those without private hospital coverage treated as Medicare patient; 
and d) those without private hospital coverage treated as a private patient.  Means and standard 
deviations for these four subgroups are presented in Table 2. Those for whom patient status was 
‘not stated’ are excluded from the means in Table 2 and from the subsequent analysis. A much 
higher proportion of the long term insured choose to be private patients when admitted to hospital 
than those with shorter insurance durations. The uninsured and those with supplementary 
insurance for less than two years have similar public patient admission rates. There appear to be 
some interesting patterns in the prevalence of long term conditions for those choosing public 
versus private treatment and this differs depending on insurance status; there is higher prevalence 
of many conditions for uninsured individuals who choose to be admitted as private patients.  
Table 2 near here 
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5. Empirical strategies 
There two major empirical challenges for the analysis. First, we have a continuous non-negative 
outcome variable, length of hospital stay, with large numbers of zeros and a skewed conditional 
distribution. To address this we use the multivariate two-part model developed by Duan et al. to 
examine how insurance affects hospital use (Duan et al. 1983).  Multi-part models were developed 
as part of the RAND Health Insurance Experiment (Manning et al. 1987).  The approach is 
commonly used to model health care utilisation (Ettner 1997; Liu et al. 1999; Seshamani and Gray 
2004).  To control for individual characteristics we include a large number of explanatory 
variables in the two-part estimation, including demographic characteristics, household structure, 
qualifications, income and concession card status, states and regions, self-assessed health and risk 
factors, and long term conditions. 
The second challenge is the potential endogeneity in insurance choice.  An individual’s decision to 
purchase supplementary private insurance is affected by many factors, such as her perception of 
her health status, expected health cost, as well as socioeconomic status and level of risk aversion. 
These factors are also likely to impact on hospital utilization.  Controlling for individual 
characteristics in the two-part estimation does not necessarily reduce the bias associated with 
selection due to insurance choice.  Individual characteristics may confound with insurance choice 
in a nonlinear fashion.  Furthermore, the distribution of these covariates may have little overlap 
between the insured and uninsured.   
In order to deal with these issues, we use propensity score matching (PSM) to identify the effect 
of private insurance on hospital utilisation.  By matching treatment and control observations that 
have similar insurance propensities, the technique aims to eliminate the potential selection bias. It 
has been shown that matching on the propensity score is equivalent to matching on the basis of the 
individual characteristics vector (Rubin 1973; Rosenbaum and Rubin 1983, 1985).  It is important 
to note that the PSM method eliminates the selection bias only if, conditioning on the propensity 
score, the insurance choice is unrelated to any unobserved variables.  In other words, if insurance 
choice is not random among individuals with the same value of propensity score, selection bias 
remains.
1  On the other hand, if the observable characteristics are correlated with the 
unobservables, then using PSM model could “balance out” the latter by controlling for the former.  
PSM methods are increasingly used in health economics to address the issue of selection bias 
(Shen 2002).  
To create propensity scores we run a logit model of insurance choice. We use the predicted 
insurance probabilities to match treatment observations (the insured) with controls (the 
uninsured). We use the Greedy 5->1 digit match algorithm (Parsons 2000), made available by the 
author.
2 The procedure makes "best" matches first then "next-best" matches in a hierarchical 
sequence until no more matches can be made. Best matches are those with the highest digit match 
on propensity score. The algorithm proceeds sequentially to the lowest digit match on propensity 
score. We modify Parson’s Greedy algorithm to introduce replacement of matched controls after 
each level of digit match.
3 Using this technique, 7,369 (88.6 percent) of those with private 
                                                 
1 To control for the selection bias caused by unobservable factors, methods such as instrumental variable approach or 
structural estimation could be used.  However, the NHS data do not provide any variable that could serve as valid 
instrument for insurance.   
2 Available at http://www2.sas.com/proceedings/sugi26/p214-26.pdf  
3 Abadie and Imbens (2002) provide arguments in favour of replacement. 
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insurance in the original sample were matched to a control.
4 Matching aims to balance the 
distributions of observed covariates between “treatment” and “control” groups based on similar 
assignment probabilities. 
We run two-part models on both the original and matched samples, for both Medicare and private 
admissions and Medicare and private lengths of stay. Stage 1 involves the estimation of a 
multinomial logit model for probability of admission (non-admission, Medicare admission, private 
admission). The results for the matched samples are presented in Appendix Table A1. In stage 2, 
OLS regressions of the log of length of stay are run for the two subgroups of admitted patients. 
The results for the matched dataset are presented in Appendix Table A2. 
Predicted admission probability and lengths of stay for all observations are combined to give 
estimates of unconditional Medicare and private length of stay. Finally we calculate the marginal 
effects of key variables (time insured) on the unconditional outcomes and use bootstrapping to 
derive confidence intervals around the estimates of marginal effects. 
6. Results 
Table 3 near here 
Table 3 presents means of explanatory variables for the matched sample by insurance status. 
Differences between means for matched pairs are evaluated and p-values presented in the final 
column of the table.  In contrast to the results for the unmatched data presented in Table 1, there 
are no longer significant differences between the insured and uninsured groups except for two 
variables (age 20 to 30, and significant ear, nose and throat disorder). This provides evidence that 
the matching technique addresses the issue of selection bias in insurance choice due to observable 
differences. 
Tables 4 and 5 near here 
Using the estimated probabilities of admission and predicted lengths of stay, we calculate 
predicted probabilities of hospital admission, length of stay conditional on admission and 
unconditional length of stay for Medicare admissions (Table 4) and private admissions (Table 5). 
In each case, results are presented for the matched and original samples and for five cases: no 
supplementary insurance (p0), insurance duration less than 1 year (plt1), between 1 and 2 years 
(p1tolt2), between 2 and 5 years (p2tolt5), and more than 5 years (pgt5). Bootstrapped standard 
errors are derived using 500 draws from the matched and original datasets. Figures 3 and 4 present 
the results graphically.  
Figures 3 and 4 near here 
For the matched sample the average predicated probability of a Medicare admission for the 
uninsured is 8.7%. This declines monotonically with duration of insurance, from 7.6% for those 
insured less than 1 year to 2.1% for those insured more than 5 years. For those with a Medicare 
admission, length of stay is quite flat across the range of insurance status; however there is a peak 
of 3.8 days for those who became insured during the earliest period of the insurance reforms. The 
unconditional Medicare length of stay (calculated as the product of predicted probability and 
                                                 
4 Estimation results for the insurance decision are available on request. 
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predicted length of stay for the whole sample) is, not surprisingly, highest for the uninsured (0.25 
days). However, those with shorter insurance durations are predicted to have Medicare lengths of 
stay between 2 and 3 times as long as the long term insured.  
For the matched sample, the probability of a private admission is predicted to be low (1.5%) for 
the uninsured. The highest admission probability is 17.1% for those insured between 2 and 5 
years, exceeding that for those insured more than 5 years (14.2%). For those admitted as private 
patients, length of stay is again quite flat across the range of insurance status; and again it is 
longest for insurance durations between 2 and 5 years (4.3 days). Unconditional private length of 
stay is very low for the uninsured (0.04 days) and tends to rise with insurance duration with a peak 
of 0.74 days for the 2 to 5 year insurance duration.  
Comparing the results for the matched samples with those for the original samples, we find that 
the selection associated with insurance choice overstates Medicare admission probabilities, 
especially for the uninsured and those with shorter insurance durations. This pattern carries 
through to unconditional Medicare lengths of stay. For private admissions, the impact of selection 
is smaller; however unconditional lengths of stay of private admission are somewhat understated 
without the correction for selection.  
Table 6 near here 
To determine a measure of the overall impact on hospital use of the insurance reforms, Table 6 
combines the simulation results for Medicare and private admissions for the matched sub-sample. 
The upper part of the table shows how Medicare, private and total unconditional length of stay 
change with insurance status and the lower part of the table presents corresponding changes in 
admission probabilities; both are relative to the uninsured. Overall, shorter insurance durations are 
associated with higher probabilities of hospital admission and longer unconditional lengths of stay 
compared with the uninsured. This is because increases in private admission probabilities and 
length of stay more than offset the falls in Medicare treatment associated with increased insurance 
coverage. For those with short insurance durations the predicted unconditional Medicare length of 
stay is quite close to that of the uninsured; it remains approximately half that of the long-term 
insured even for insurance durations of 2 to 5 years.  
The results provide evidence that the insurance incentives reduced pressure on the public hospital 
system at least to some extent. However, it is not clear that the budgetary cost associated with the 
incentives is justified by the reduction in public inpatient treatment. In 2001/2 the government’s 
30% subsidy to private health insurance premiums amounted to $A2.1 billion. Using the estimated 
reductions in Medicare admissions and hospital days, we undertake a preliminary analysis of the 
cost effectiveness of the private insurance incentives. We find that the cost of the rebate amounts 
to $28,606 per reduced Medicare admission or $11,055 per reduced Medicare patient day. We can 
compare these with the actual average cost per admission and per day in a public hospital in 
2001/02: $2,861 per admission and $858 per day. The comparison would be even more dramatic if 
we took account of the budgetary cost of the medical subsidies to private hospital treatment 
associated with higher rates of private hospital usage of the newly insured.  
In the longer term, as individuals gain experience with the private system the behaviour of the 
newly insured could become more like that of the long-term insured. If we recalculate the cost 
effectiveness of the rebate applying rates of Medicare use for the long-term insured to those newly 
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insured, the costs are reduced to $11,835 per admission and $4,091 per day, still far exceeding the 
average costs of public treatment.  
7. Discussion 
Our results on admission probabilities and unconditional lengths of stay differ for the original and 
matched samples, indicating the existence of selection associated with insurance choice. 
Unconditional Medicare and private lengths of stay also differ by length of time with private 
insurance cover. Shorter periods in cover are associated with behaviour more like that of the 
uninsured than those insured prior to the insurance incentives. Even for insurance durations 
between 2 and 5 years (well after any waiting period for reimbursement for private treatment 
would have been exhausted) the use of Medicare system resembles that of the uninsured more 
than the long term insured. We find robust evidence that among those with private hospital 
insurance, those who were insured for less that two years are consistently more likely to use public 
hospital as Medicare patient, and even stay in public hospital longer than those insured more than 
5 years.  The use of the private system is highest for those insured between 2 and 5 years with 
considerably larger unconditional lengths of stay for this group than any other. 
In summary, the insurance incentives increased supplementary private cover substantially but the 
impact on their use of the public system appears to be less pronounced. The newly-insured do not, 
at least in the short term, act like the long-term insured in terms of Medicare and private hospital 
use. Increased private usage outweighs reduced public usage. This effect may change with longer 
insurance durations, a topic for future research. Even if this happens, the insurance incentives 
appear to be a relatively ineffective and extremely costly way of reducing pressure on the public 
hospital system. 
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With PHI 8,328 
 47.1% 
Without PHI 9,332 
52.7% 
Admitted to hospital 1,345 
14.4%
No admission 7,987 
85.6%
Not known 34 
0.1% 
Admitted to hospital 1,224 
14.7% 
No admission 7,104 
85.3%
Medicare patient 1,167 
86.8% 
Private patient 156 
11.6% 
Not stated 22 
1.6% 
Medicare patient 268 
21.9% 
Private patient 948 
77.5% 
Not known 8 
0.7%    
 
Table 1: Means and tests of difference between means for the full sample and 
 insured and uninsured sub-samples 
 
  Full sample 17,694  Uninsured 9,366  Insured 8,328  Test of 
means 
Variable  Mean Std  Dev Mean Std Dev  Mean  Std Dev  P-value 
age20lt30  0.153 0.360 0.204 0.403 0.095 0.294  <.0001 
age30lt40  0.219 0.413 0.212 0.409 0.227 0.419 0.018 
age40lt50  0.211 0.408 0.175 0.380 0.252 0.434  <.0001 
age50lt60  0.152 0.359 0.119 0.324 0.189 0.391  <.0001 
age60lt65  0.061 0.240 0.058 0.235 0.064 0.245 0.106 
age65lt75  0.102 0.303 0.106 0.308 0.098 0.297 0.069 
agege75  0.083 0.276 0.099 0.299 0.066 0.248  <.0001 
female  0.545 0.498 0.542 0.498 0.548 0.498 0.491 
married  0.563 0.496 0.466 0.499 0.671 0.470  <.0001 
children  0.676 1.050 0.666 1.056 0.688 1.043 0.165 
tertiary 0.163  0.369  0.094 0.292 0.240 0.427  <.0001 
diploma  0.095 0.293 0.075 0.263 0.117 0.322  <.0001 
otherqual  0.245 0.430 0.249 0.432 0.241 0.428 0.228 
incomek  0.886 0.636 0.676 0.450 1.122 0.726  <.0001 
missoinc  0.390 0.488 0.178 0.382 0.184 0.388 0.268 
concard  0.017 0.130 0.533 0.499 0.228 0.420  <.0001 
dvapen  0.021 0.144 0.024 0.154 0.009 0.096  <.0001 
dvawid  0.220 0.414 0.033 0.179 0.008 0.087  <.0001 
NSW  0.207 0.405 0.223 0.416 0.217 0.412 0.313 
VIC  0.176 0.381 0.208 0.406 0.206 0.404 0.750 
QLD  0.117 0.321 0.187 0.390 0.162 0.369  <.0001 
SA  0.123 0.329 0.119 0.324 0.114 0.318 0.286 
WA  0.065 0.247 0.115 0.319 0.133 0.340 0.000 
TAS  0.015 0.121 0.067 0.251 0.062 0.242 0.175 
NT  0.077 0.267 0.015 0.122 0.014 0.119 0.631 
ACT  0.666 0.472 0.065 0.246 0.091 0.287  <.0001 
capital  0.048 0.215 0.628 0.483 0.708 0.455  <.0001 
notcapurban 0.236 0.424 0.050 0.219 0.046 0.210 0.198 
otherurban  0.119 0.324 0.270 0.444 0.197 0.398  <.0001 
rural  0.119 0.324 0.119 0.324 0.119 0.324 0.996 
excellent  0.172 0.377 0.149 0.356 0.198 0.398  <.0001 
verygood  0.318 0.466 0.286 0.452 0.354 0.478  <.0001 
good  0.311 0.463 0.319 0.466 0.302 0.459 0.015 
fair  0.147 0.354 0.174 0.380 0.116 0.320  <.0001 
poor  0.052 0.223 0.072 0.259 0.030 0.170  <.0001 
thin  0.078 0.268 0.088 0.283 0.066 0.249  <.0001 
normal  0.465 0.499 0.472 0.499 0.458 0.498 0.054 
overweigt 0.307  0.461  0.287 0.453 0.328 0.470  <.0001 
obese  0.150 0.357 0.153 0.360 0.148 0.355 0.343 
missbmi 0.087  0.282  0.103 0.303 0.070 0.255  <.0001 
exhigh  0.058 0.234 0.054 0.226 0.063 0.243 0.010 
exmod  0.248 0.432 0.233 0.423 0.265 0.441  <.0001 
exlow  0.384 0.486 0.362 0.481 0.409 0.492  <.0001 
exsed  0.009 0.097 0.009 0.096 0.010 0.098 0.828 
exno  0.300 0.458 0.342 0.474 0.254 0.435  <.0001 
smokes  0.233 0.423 0.308 0.462 0.148 0.355  <.0001 
drinks  1.177 2.443 1.177 2.753 1.177 1.922 0.996 
missalc  0.000 0.017 0.000 0.021 0.000 0.019 0.823 
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Table 1: continued 
 
  Whole sample 17,694  Uninsured 9,366  Insured 8,328  Test of 
means 
Variable  Mean Std  Dev Mean Std Dev  Mean  Std Dev  P-value 
Other Infectious Diseases  0.058 0.234 1.177 2.753 1.177 1.922 0.996 
Breast, Prostate, Colon Cancers   0.248 0.432 0.000 0.021 0.000 0.019 0.823 
Other Neoplasms  0.384 0.486 0.019 0.136 0.017 0.128 0.292 
Diabetes with No Complications  0.009 0.097 0.038 0.191 0.027 0.162  <.0001 
Type I Diabetes Mellitus  0.300 0.458 0.006 0.080 0.005 0.072 0.278 
Other Endocrine/ disorders  0.233 0.423 0.081 0.273 0.088 0.283 0.125 
Peptic Ulcer, Hemorrhage, etc   0.036 0.186 0.039 0.193 0.033 0.178 0.036 
Other Gastrointestinal Disorders  0.077 0.266 0.075 0.263 0.079 0.270 0.238 
Rheumatoid Arthritis, etc   0.035 0.183 0.039 0.194 0.030 0.170 0.001 
Disorders of the Vertebrae, 
Spine  0.006 0.078 0.006 0.080 0.006 0.076 0.584 
Osteoporosis, Bone/Cartilage   0.034 0.182 0.033 0.179 0.035 0.185 0.420 
Other Musculoskeletal   0.417 0.493 0.421 0.494 0.413 0.492 0.253 
Disorders of Immunity  0.003 0.054 0.003 0.053 0.003 0.055 0.780 
Iron Deficiency and Anemias   0.020 0.138 0.021 0.142 0.018 0.134 0.238 
Drug/Alcohol Abuse  0.010 0.098 0.014 0.119 0.005 0.067  <.0001 
Personality Disorders  0.056 0.230 0.067 0.250 0.043 0.204  <.0001 
Depression  0.007 0.084 0.010 0.098 0.004 0.066  <.0001 
Anxiety Disorders  0.056 0.230 0.064 0.244 0.048 0.213  <.0001 
Other Psychiatric Disorders  0.036 0.186 0.044 0.205 0.027 0.161  <.0001 
Other Developmental Disability  0.001 0.034 0.001 0.037 0.001 0.029 0.279 
Seizure Disorders Convulsions  0.007 0.084 0.009 0.093 0.006 0.074 0.014 
Mononeuropathy, Neurological   0.080 0.271 0.081 0.274 0.077 0.267 0.325 
Unstable Angina, Ischemic   0.010 0.097 0.010 0.101 0.009 0.093 0.243 
Angina Pectoris/Old Myocardial   0.021 0.143 0.029 0.169 0.012 0.108  <.0001 
Hypertensive Heart Disease  0.146 0.353 0.144 0.351 0.148 0.355 0.378 
Other and Unspecified Heart  0.001 0.034 0.001 0.031 0.001 0.036 0.477 
Cerebrovascular Disease  0.031 0.174 0.038 0.191 0.024 0.153  <.0001 
Vascular Disease  0.015 0.123 0.018 0.133 0.012 0.111 0.002 
Other Circulatory Disease  0.043 0.204 0.042 0.201 0.045 0.207 0.414 
Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary   0.009 0.096 0.013 0.113 0.005 0.072  <.0001 
Asthma  0.109 0.312 0.115 0.320 0.102 0.303 0.005 
Other Lung Disorders  0.035 0.184 0.041 0.199 0.028 0.164  <.0001 
Glaucoma  0.014 0.116 0.014 0.118 0.013 0.113 0.518 
Cataract  0.029 0.168 0.031 0.174 0.027 0.162 0.099 
Other Eye Disorders  0.664 0.472 0.619 0.486 0.715 0.451  <.0001 
Significant Ear, Nose, Throat   0.003 0.057 0.002 0.046 0.004 0.067 0.007 
Hearing Loss  0.142 0.349 0.145 0.352 0.138 0.345 0.199 
Other Ear, Nose, Throat, Mouth   0.297 0.457 0.284 0.451 0.311 0.463 0.000 
Urinary Obstruction Retention  0.027 0.163 0.028 0.166 0.027 0.161 0.502 
Incontinence  0.015 0.121 0.014 0.117 0.016 0.125 0.307 
Other Urinary Tract Disorders  0.017 0.127 0.016 0.127 0.017 0.128 0.853 
Male Genital Disorders  0.003 0.053 0.002 0.048 0.003 0.057 0.259 
Other Dermatological Disorders  0.037 0.188 0.035 0.183 0.039 0.193 0.186 
Other Injuries  0.055 0.229 0.057 0.232 0.053 0.225 0.243 
Major Abnormalities  0.004 0.066 0.005 0.069 0.004 0.062 0.332 
Minor Symptoms, Signs  0.122 0.328 0.120 0.325 0.125 0.331 0.250 
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Table 2: Means for those admitted to hospital in the last 12 months by insurance and patient type 
   Insured Uninsured 
  Medicare 268  Private 948  Medicare 1,167  Private 156 
Variable  Mean Std  Dev Mean Std  Dev Mean Std  Dev Mean Std  Dev 
dge5  0.411 0.493 0.784 0.411  .  .  .  . 
d2tolt5  0.072 0.259 0.079 0.270  .  .  .  . 
d1tolt2  0.250 0.434 0.090 0.286  .  .  .  . 
dlt1  0.267 0.443 0.047 0.212  .  .  .  . 
age20lt30  0.114 0.319 0.087 0.282 0.233 0.423 0.112 0.316 
age30lt40  0.280 0.450 0.203 0.402 0.188 0.391 0.161 0.369 
age40lt50  0.182 0.387 0.158 0.365 0.124 0.330 0.126 0.333 
age50lt60  0.191 0.394 0.155 0.363 0.102 0.303 0.077 0.267 
age60lt65  0.051 0.220 0.085 0.279 0.068 0.252 0.028 0.165 
age65lt75  0.102 0.303 0.171 0.377 0.127 0.333 0.091 0.288 
agege75  0.076 0.266 0.134 0.341 0.138 0.345 0.406 0.493 
female  0.597 0.491 0.618 0.486 0.617 0.486 0.490 0.502 
married  0.686 0.465 0.667 0.472 0.472 0.499 0.399 0.491 
children  0.818 1.176 0.624 1.055 0.773 1.162 0.399 0.806 
tertiary  0.199 0.400 0.188 0.391 0.066 0.248 0.077 0.267 
diploma  0.114 0.319 0.121 0.327 0.072 0.259 0.091 0.288 
otherqual  0.263 0.441 0.240 0.428 0.254 0.436 0.217 0.414 
incomek  1.064 0.676 0.975 0.695 0.579 0.378 0.651 0.555 
concard  0.314 0.465 0.371 0.483 0.693 0.462 0.643 0.481 
dvapen  0.013 0.112 0.009 0.097 0.026 0.158 0.196 0.398 
dvawid  0.013 0.112 0.021 0.144 0.031 0.174 0.329 0.471 
NSW  0.220 0.415 0.186 0.389 0.222 0.416 0.238 0.427 
VIC  0.203 0.403 0.219 0.414 0.201 0.401 0.273 0.447 
QLD  0.114 0.319 0.174 0.380 0.194 0.395 0.245 0.431 
SA  0.110 0.314 0.115 0.320 0.121 0.326 0.049 0.217 
WA  0.157 0.364 0.141 0.349 0.121 0.326 0.056 0.231 
TAS  0.059 0.237 0.081 0.273 0.061 0.239 0.070 0.256 
NT  0.025 0.158 0.015 0.123 0.018 0.134 0.007 0.084 
ACT  0.110 0.314 0.067 0.250 0.062 0.242 0.063 0.244 
capital  0.648 0.479 0.683 0.466 0.568 0.496 0.587 0.494 
notcapurban  0.038 0.192 0.049 0.217 0.053 0.225 0.091 0.288 
otherurban  0.275 0.448 0.220 0.415 0.335 0.472 0.273 0.447 
rural  0.140 0.348 0.124 0.329 0.116 0.320 0.133 0.341 
excellent  0.131 0.339 0.146 0.353 0.080 0.271 0.063 0.244 
verygood  0.233 0.424 0.240 0.428 0.206 0.405 0.196 0.398 
good  0.309 0.463 0.318 0.466 0.302 0.459 0.280 0.450 
fair  0.220 0.415 0.212 0.409 0.236 0.425 0.280 0.450 
poor  0.106 0.308 0.084 0.277 0.176 0.381 0.182 0.387 
thin  0.085 0.279 0.066 0.248 0.097 0.296 0.105 0.307 
normal  0.364 0.482 0.412 0.493 0.436 0.496 0.420 0.495 
overweight  0.347 0.477 0.343 0.475 0.272 0.445 0.301 0.460 
obese  0.203 0.403 0.179 0.384 0.195 0.397 0.175 0.381 
exhigh  0.051 0.220 0.047 0.212 0.023 0.150 0.014 0.118 
exmod  0.208 0.406 0.213 0.410 0.209 0.407 0.210 0.409 
exlow  0.394 0.490 0.418 0.494 0.362 0.481 0.322 0.469 
exsed  0.008 0.092 0.014 0.118 0.013 0.113 0.007 0.084 
exno  0.339 0.474 0.307 0.462 0.393 0.489 0.448 0.499 
Smoke  0.182 0.387 0.124 0.329 0.332 0.471 0.189 0.393 
drinks  1.023 2.139 0.963 1.691 1.007 2.689 0.999 2.231 
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Table 2: continued 
   Insured Uninsured 
  Medicare 268  Private 948  Medicare 1,167  Private 156 
Variable  Mean Std  Dev  Mean Std  Dev Mean  Std  Dev Mean Std  Dev 
Other Infectious Diseases  0.017 0.129 0.015 0.123 0.017 0.131 0.021 0.144 
Breast, Prostate, Colon Cancers   0.017 0.129 0.020 0.140 0.016 0.124 0.035 0.184 
Other Neoplasms  0.042 0.202 0.031 0.172 0.040 0.197 0.084 0.278 
Diabetes with No Complications  0.034 0.181 0.048 0.215 0.060 0.237 0.042 0.201 
Type I Diabetes Mellitus  0.008 0.092 0.008 0.090 0.018 0.134 0.014 0.118 
Other Endocrine/ disorders  0.106 0.308 0.112 0.315 0.106 0.309 0.154 0.362 
Peptic Ulcer, Hemorrhage, etc   0.059 0.237 0.051 0.219 0.058 0.233 0.098 0.298 
Other Gastrointestinal Disorders  0.081 0.273 0.125 0.331 0.107 0.310 0.175 0.381 
Rheumatoid Arthritis, etc   0.047 0.211 0.059 0.236 0.060 0.237 0.133 0.341 
Disorders of the Vertebrae, Spine  0.008 0.092 0.007 0.084 0.011 0.104 0.000 0.000 
Osteoporosis, Bone/Cartilage   0.042 0.202 0.091 0.287 0.061 0.239 0.105 0.307 
Other Musculoskeletal   0.466 0.500 0.492 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.636 0.483 
Disorders of Immunity  0.008 0.092 0.005 0.069 0.006 0.074 0.014 0.118 
Iron Deficiency and Anemias   0.042 0.202 0.031 0.172 0.045 0.207 0.035 0.184 
Drug/Alcohol Abuse  0.017 0.129 0.006 0.077 0.018 0.134 0.021 0.144 
Personality Disorders  0.068 0.252 0.067 0.250 0.102 0.303 0.091 0.288 
Depression  0.004 0.065 0.005 0.069 0.010 0.100 0.007 0.084 
Anxiety Disorders  0.064 0.244 0.053 0.224 0.086 0.281 0.105 0.307 
Other Psychiatric Disorders  0.068 0.252 0.055 0.229 0.079 0.270 0.042 0.201 
Other Developmental Disability  0.000 0.000 0.002 0.049 0.002 0.043 0.000 0.000 
Seizure Disorders Convulsions  0.030 0.170 0.009 0.097 0.017 0.127 0.007 0.084 
Mononeuropathy, Neurological   0.102 0.303 0.075 0.264 0.107 0.310 0.091 0.288 
Unstable Angina, Ischemic   0.030 0.170 0.026 0.159 0.027 0.161 0.070 0.256 
Angina Pectoris/Old Myocardial   0.025 0.158 0.039 0.193 0.069 0.253 0.154 0.362 
Hypertensive Heart Disease  0.182 0.387 0.234 0.424 0.195 0.397 0.217 0.414 
Other and Unspecified Heart  0.000 0.000 0.002 0.049 0.002 0.043 0.000 0.000 
Cerebrovascular Disease  0.064 0.244 0.059 0.236 0.086 0.281 0.133 0.341 
Vascular Disease  0.021 0.144 0.034 0.182 0.046 0.209 0.077 0.267 
Other Circulatory Disease  0.047 0.211 0.073 0.260 0.062 0.242 0.042 0.201 
Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary   0.025 0.158 0.007 0.084 0.030 0.171 0.049 0.217 
Asthma  0.114 0.319 0.126 0.332 0.177 0.382 0.105 0.307 
Other Lung Disorders  0.047 0.211 0.027 0.162 0.060 0.237 0.049 0.217 
Glaucoma  0.021 0.144 0.021 0.144 0.018 0.134 0.056 0.231 
Cataract  0.025 0.158 0.052 0.222 0.052 0.223 0.105 0.307 
Other Eye Disorders  0.653 0.477 0.771 0.420 0.650 0.477 0.748 0.436 
Significant Ear, Nose, Throat   0.008 0.092 0.002 0.049 0.003 0.052 0.007 0.084 
Hearing Loss  0.182 0.387 0.203 0.402 0.172 0.378 0.315 0.466 
Other Ear, Nose, Throat, Mouth   0.331 0.471 0.312 0.464 0.273 0.446 0.245 0.431 
Urinary Obstruction Retention  0.055 0.229 0.047 0.212 0.048 0.213 0.049 0.217 
Incontinence  0.055 0.229 0.027 0.162 0.021 0.144 0.042 0.201 
Other Urinary Tract Disorders  0.047 0.211 0.021 0.144 0.029 0.169 0.035 0.184 
Male Genital Disorders  0.004 0.065 0.007 0.084 0.006 0.074 0.007 0.084 
Other Dermatological Disorders  0.042 0.202 0.042 0.202 0.032 0.176 0.042 0.201 
Other Injuries  0.076 0.266 0.073 0.260 0.078 0.268 0.112 0.316 
Major Abnormalities  0.004 0.065 0.001 0.034 0.007 0.085 0.014 0.118 
Minor Symptoms, Signs  0.157 0.364 0.176 0.381 0.173 0.379 0.175 0.381 
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Table 3: Means and tests of difference between means for 
the insured and uninsured matched sub-samples 
 
  Uninsured 9,366  Insured 8,328  Test of means 
Variable  Mean Std  Dev Mean Std  Dev  P-value 
age20lt30  0.121 0.327 0.106 0.308 0.004 
age30lt40  0.228 0.419 0.231 0.422 0.624 
age40lt50  0.240 0.427 0.240 0.427 0.969 
age50lt60  0.176 0.381 0.171 0.377 0.421 
age60lt65  0.065 0.247 0.065 0.247 0.920 
age65lt75  0.094 0.292 0.104 0.305 0.057 
agege75  0.067 0.250 0.072 0.258 0.300 
female  0.547 0.498 0.551 0.497 0.631 
married  0.650 0.477 0.644 0.479 0.438 
children  0.664 1.025 0.670 1.035 0.755 
tertiary  0.196 0.397 0.194 0.396 0.803 
diploma  0.122 0.327 0.112 0.315 0.054 
otherqual  0.248 0.432 0.255 0.436   0.092 
incomek  0.978 0.570 0.974 0.555 0.661 
missoinc  0.196 0.397 0.199 0.400 0.562 
concard  0.250 0.433 0.257 0.437 0.344 
dvapen  0.009 0.093 0.010 0.102 0.271 
dvawid  0.010 0.098 0.009 0.093 0.545 
NSW  0.218 0.413 0.216 0.411 0.689 
VIC  0.208 0.406 0.205 0.404 0.669 
QLD  0.162 0.369 0.166 0.372 0.491 
SA  0.112 0.316 0.115 0.319 0.568 
WA  0.136 0.343 0.131 0.338 0.384 
TAS  0.058 0.234 0.064 0.244 0.158 
NT  0.016 0.124 0.015 0.121 0.688 
ACT  0.089 0.285 0.087 0.282 0.749 
capital  0.695 0.460 0.694 0.461 0.886 
notcapurban  0.045 0.207 0.048 0.213 0.388 
otherurban  0.203 0.402 0.208 0.406 0.403 
rural  0.121 0.326 0.122 0.328 0.762 
excellent  0.196 0.397 0.189 0.392 0.316 
verygood  0.352 0.478 0.345 0.476 0.417 
good  0.304 0.460 0.310 0.463 0.382 
fair  0.118 0.323 0.122 0.328 0.463 
poor  0.031 0.172 0.033 0.178 0.424 
thin  0.068 0.252 0.067 0.250 0.768 
normal  0.455 0.498 0.460 0.498 0.530 
overweight  0.325 0.469 0.322 0.467 0.647 
obese  0.152 0.359 0.151 0.358 0.945 
missbmi  0.069 0.254 0.074 0.262 0.264 
exhigh  0.063 0.242 0.061 0.239 0.632 
exmod  0.252 0.434 0.258 0.438 0.427 
exlow  0.407 0.491 0.400 0.490 0.392 
exsed  0.011 0.102 0.009 0.097 0.509 
exno  0.267 0.443 0.272 0.445 0.565 
smokes  0.152 0.359 0.162 0.368 0.094 
drinks  1.114 2.152 1.146 1.930 0.340 
missalc  0.000 0.016 0.000 0.020 0.655 
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Table 3: continued 
 
  Uninsured 9,366  Insured 8,328  Test of means 
Variable  Mean Std  Dev Mean Std  Dev  P-value 
Other Infectious Diseases  0.010 0.100 0.011 0.105 0.520 
Breast, Prostate, Colon Cancers   0.004 0.059 0.005 0.073 0.106 
Other Neoplasms  0.016 0.126 0.017 0.129 0.697 
Diabetes with No Complications  0.032 0.175 0.029 0.168 0.388 
Type I Diabetes Mellitus  0.006 0.075 0.005 0.073 0.825 
Other Endocrine/ disorders  0.084 0.278 0.085 0.279 0.882 
Peptic Ulcer, Hemorrhage, etc   0.031 0.172 0.034 0.182 0.194 
Other Gastrointestinal Disorders  0.073 0.260 0.078 0.269 0.213 
Rheumatoid Arthritis, etc   0.028 0.164 0.031 0.174 0.206 
Disorders of the Vertebrae, Spine  0.006 0.079 0.006 0.078 0.916 
Osteoporosis, Bone/Cartilage   0.033 0.179 0.034 0.182 0.648 
Other Musculoskeletal   0.403 0.491 0.418 0.493 0.082 
Disorders of Immunity  0.003 0.051 0.003 0.053 0.752 
Iron Deficiency and Anemias   0.016 0.126 0.019 0.136 0.186 
Drug/Alcohol Abuse  0.003 0.058 0.005 0.071 0.127 
Personality Disorders  0.046 0.210 0.046 0.209 0.875 
Depression  0.003 0.053 0.005 0.068 0.097 
Anxiety Disorders  0.047 0.212 0.049 0.216 0.590 
Other Psychiatric Disorders  0.026 0.159 0.027 0.163 0.682 
Other Developmental Disability  0.001 0.029 0.001 0.026 0.763 
Seizure Disorders Convulsions  0.005 0.071 0.006 0.079 0.322 
Mononeuropathy, Neurological   0.075 0.264 0.078 0.268 0.536 
Unstable Angina, Ischemic   0.009 0.094 0.009 0.094 0.930 
Angina Pectoris/Old Myocardial   0.015 0.120 0.013 0.114 0.481 
Hypertensive Heart Disease  0.145 0.352 0.149 0.356 0.471 
Other and Unspecified Heart  0.001 0.029 0.001 0.037 0.317 
Cerebrovascular Disease  0.025 0.157 0.026 0.161 0.640 
Vascular Disease  0.012 0.109 0.013 0.112 0.655 
Other Circulatory Disease  0.045 0.208 0.046 0.209 0.874 
Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary   0.004 0.066 0.006 0.076 0.203 
Asthma  0.097 0.296 0.103 0.304 0.272 
Other Lung Disorders  0.029 0.168 0.029 0.169 0.845 
Glaucoma  0.011 0.104 0.013 0.115 0.175 
Cataract  0.025 0.157 0.028 0.165 0.331 
Other Eye Disorders  0.704 0.457 0.701 0.458 0.679 
Significant Ear, Nose, Throat   0.002 0.044 0.004 0.060 0.042 
Hearing Loss  0.136 0.342 0.140 0.347 0.444 
Other Ear, Nose, Throat, Mouth   0.309 0.462 0.306 0.461 0.721 
Urinary Obstruction Retention  0.023 0.149 0.026 0.161 0.151 
Incontinence  0.015 0.122 0.016 0.125 0.689 
Other Urinary Tract Disorders  0.015 0.123 0.017 0.129 0.513 
Male Genital Disorders  0.003 0.055 0.003 0.057 0.768 
Other Dermatological Disorders  0.036 0.187 0.038 0.192 0.460 
Other Injuries  0.052 0.223 0.054 0.225 0.713 
Major Abnormalities  0.003 0.053 0.004 0.065 0.165 
Minor Symptoms, Signs  0.118 0.322 0.123 0.329 0.299 
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Table 4: Probability of Medicare admission, conditional length of stay conditional and unconditional length of stay by time in 
cover for the original and matched samples 
 
  Matched Original      Matched Original      Matched Original   
Variable  Mean  Std Dev  Mean  Std Dev  Variable  Mean  Std Dev  Mean  Std Dev  Variable  Mean  Std Dev  Mean  Std Dev 
p0  0.087 0.004 0.108 0.003  losp0  2.841 3.589 2.930 0.247  unc_los0  0.254 0.099 0.315 0.028 
plt1  0.076 0.010 0.091 0.009  loslt1  2.672 4.237 2.806 0.983  unc_loslt1  0.205 0.148 0.253 0.103 
p1tolt2  0.055 0.010 0.069 0.009  los1tolt2  3.221 3.988 3.618 0.749  unc_los1tolt2  0.180 0.126 0.246 0.072 
p2tolt5  0.039 0.010 0.045 0.010  los2tolt5  3.763 4.406 3.727 2.317  unc_los2tolt5  0.145 0.139 0.163 0.136 




Table 5: Probability of private admission, conditional length of stay conditional and unconditional length of stay by time in 
cover for the original and matched samples 
 
  Matched Original      Matched Original      Matched Original   
Variable  Mean  Std Dev  Mean  Std Dev  Variable  Mean  Std Dev  Mean  Std Dev  Variable  Mean  Std Dev  Mean  Std Dev 
p0  0.015 0.002 0.015 0.001  losp0  2.899 1.599 2.556 1.036  unc_los0  0.044 0.023 0.047 0.027 
plt1  0.058 0.009 0.058 0.008  loslt1  2.426 2.831 2.521 2.181  unc_loslt1  0.161 0.148 0.143 0.138 
p1tolt2  0.094 0.010 0.089 0.009  los1tolt2  3.159 2.178 3.159 1.442  unc_los1tolt2  0.317 0.162 0.282 0.186 
p2tolt5  0.171 0.021 0.169 0.016  los2tolt5  4.287 2.776 4.227 1.752  unc_los2tolt5  0.744 0.451 0.704 0.346 
pge5  0.142 0.006 0.140 0.006  losge5  3.393 1.599 3.517 1.257  unc_losge5  0.525 0.165 0.469 0.241 
 
    
Figure 3: Probability of Medicare admission, conditional length of stay and unconditional length of 
stay by duration of supplementary cover 
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Figure 4: Probability of Private admission, conditional length of stay and unconditional length of 
stay by duration of supplementary cover 
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  Unconditional length of stay 
  Medicare Private  Total 
Insurance  status  LOS  Change LOS Change LOS Change 
Not insured  0.254     0.044     0.298    
Less  than  1  year  0.205  -0.048 0.161 0.117 0.366 0.069 
1 to 2 years  0.180  -0.074  0.317  0.273  0.497  0.199 
2 to 5 years  0.145  -0.109  0.744  0.700  0.889  0.591 
5  or  more  years  0.063  -0.191 0.525 0.481 0.588 0.290 
           
           
           
Probability of admission 
  Medicare Private  Total 
Insurance  status  Prob  Change Prob Change Prob Change 
Not insured  8.7%     1.5%     10.2%    
Less than 1 year  7.6%  -1.1%  5.8%  4.3%  13.4%  3.2% 
1 to 2 years  5.5%  -3.2%  9.4%  7.9%  14.9%  4.7% 
2 to 5 years  3.9%  -4.9%  17.1%  15.6%  21.0%  10.7% 
5 or more years  2.1%  -6.6%  14.2%  12.7%  16.3%  6.1%    
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Table A1: MNL model results for matched sample 
 Medicare  admission  Private admission 
Parameter  Estimate     Upper  
Intercept  -4.545**    
Odds   Lower   Upper   Estimate  Odds   Lower
         -2.757  **       
noins  1.361** 3.90 3.14  4.85  -2.410 **  0.09  0.07  0.11 
dlt1  1.266** 3.55 2.56  4.91   0.53    -0.963 **  0.38  0.28
d1tolt2  52** 2.59  65 -0.50 0.47  0.9 1.84  3. 0  **  0.61  0.78 
d tolt5 * 2.01  1.01  2   0.696* 1.19  3.39 0.291  **  1.34  1.78 
a 30lt ** 0.71 55     0.70  1.23  ge 40  -0.349  0.   0.91 -0.072  0.93 
a 40lt * 0.49 37 **  0.43  0.79  ge 50  -0.712*  0.   0.65 -0.539  0.58 
a 50lt * 0.58 42    **  0.45  0.86  ge 60  -0.544*  0. 0.79 -0.481  0.62 
a 60lt .672** 0.51 34    *  0.45  1.01  ge 65  -0  0. 0.77 -0.401  0.67 
a 65lt .536** 0.59 39        0.63  1.42  ge 75  -0  0. 0.88 -0.053  0.95 
a ge7 ** 0.55 35        0.66  1.57  ge 5  -0.590  0. 0.87 0.019  1.02 
female 0.027    1.03  0.86  1.23 0.150  *  1.16  97  1.39  0.
m rried 0.033    1.0 0.86  1.24 0.055      1.06  88  1.26  a   3  0.
children  0.181** 1.20 1.10  1.30 0.083  *  1.09  99  1.19  0.
Employ T -0.013    0.99  0.79 1.24  0.326  **  1.39 11 1.73  P 1.
Unemp 0.257    1.29  0.76 1.43  0.78  2.65    2.20 0.361     
NotinLF  89** 1.48  88 0.49 1.29  0.3 1.16  1. 1  **  1.63  2.07 
study -0.124    0.88  .67        0.62  1.12 0 1.16 -0.186 0.83   
incomek 0.174    1.19 73 1.95 -0.159      0.85  0.56  1.30    0.  
incuksq -0.108    0.90  76         0.97  1.26  0. 1.06 0.096 1.10 
missuinc -0.191*  0.83  67          0.85  1.23  0. 1.01 0.022 1.02 
concard 0.158    1.17  92   *  0.63  1.00  0. 1.49 -0.232  0.79 
dvapen -0.236    0.79  38       0.38  1.35  0. 1.65 -0.330  0.72 
dvawid -0.302    0.74  **  1.82  5.00  0.35  1.55 1.104  3.02 
VIC 0.010    1.01  0.81  1.26 0.194  *  1.21  0.97  1.52 
QLD -0.173    0.84  0.66  1.07 0.275  **  1.32  1.04  1.66 
SA -0.032    0.97  0.74  1.27 0.195      1.22  0.93  1.58 
WA 0.167    1.18  0.92  1.52 0.228  *  1.26  0.98  1.62 
TAS -0.451**  0.64  0.45  0.91  0.180     1.20  0.87  1.65 
NT -0.963**  0.38  0.17  0.84  0.237     1.27  0.69  2.33 
ACT 0.553**  1.74  1.31  2.30  0.101     1.11  0.81  1.51 
notcapurban -0.161    0.85  0.58 1.26 -0.121     0.89  0.62 1.26 
otherurban 0.546**  1.73  1.43  2.08 0.037      1.04  0.86  1.26 
rural 0.279**  1.32  1.05  1.67  0.081     1.08  0.86  1.36 
verygood 0.282**  1.33  1.04  1.69  -0.049     0.95  0.76  1.20 
good 0.408**  1.50  1.17  1.94  0.228 *  1.26  1.00  1.58 
fair 0.768**  2.16  1.61  2.89 0.612  **  1.84  1.41  2.42 
poor 1.293**  3.64  2.49  5.32  0.928 **  2.53  1.73  3.69 
thin 0.176    1.19  0.89  1.59 0.081      1.08  0.81  1.45 
overweight 0.132    1.14  0.95  1.37 0.110      1.12  0.94  1.33 
obese 0.325**  1.38  1.12  1.71  0.116     1.12  0.90  1.40 
missbmi -0.038    0.96  0.71  1.30 -0.236     0.79  0.58 1.08 
Smoke -0.036    0.96  0.78  1.19 -0.005     1.00  0.80 1.23 
drinks -0.018      0.98  0.94  1.02 -0.002     1.00  0.96 1.04 
missalc -9.155      <0.001  <0.001  >999.999 -9.883      <0.001  <0.001  >999.999 
exhigh 0.008      1.01  0.71  1.44 0.086      1.09  0.78  1.53 
exmod 0.014      1.01  0.84  1.23 -0.174  *  0.84  0.70 1.01 
exsed 0.456      1.58  0.87  2.87 0.427      1.53  0.80  2.94 
exno 0.106      1.11  0.93  1.33 0.027      1.03  0.86  1.22 
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ate  s  r  r   e     r   r  
    1.04  0.82  .31  98  .78  .22 
Table A1: continued 
 Medicare  admissi Private admission
Parameter Estim Odd   Lowe Uppe Estimat Odds Lowe Uppe
tertiary 0.034  1 -0.024  0. 0 1
diploma  **  28  00  3    5  7  0.244  1. 1. 1.6 0.076  1.08 0.8 1.3
otherqual  **  22  02  7    7  5  0.199  1. 1. 1.4 0.039  1.04 0.8 1.2
missqual  **  00  37  3    7  7  0.694  2. 1. 2.9 0.086  1.09 0.6 1.7
bornaust      01  84  0    6  7  0.007  1. 0. 1.2 0.135  1.15 0.9 1.3
Other Infectious 
    00  53  8          Diseases  0.000  1. 0. 1.8 0.598 ** 1.82 1.05 3.13
Breast, Prostate, 
rs   **  38  59  5          Colon Cance 1.217  3. 1. 7.1 1.238 ** 3.45 1.78 6.69
Other Neoplasms  **  69  09  4        0.527  1. 1. 2.6 0.380 *  1.46 0.95 2.26
Diabetes with No 
    05  73  1          Complications  0.048  1. 0. 1.5 -0.111   0.90 0.62 1.29
Type I Diabetes 




     94  73  1        -0.063 0. 0. 1.2 0.001     1.00 0.78 1.28
Peptic Ulcer, 




  9     17  91  0  *        0.15 1. 0. 1.5 0.381 * 1.46 1.16 1.84
Rheumatoid 




Spine  0 *  92  99  1          0.65 1. 0. 3.7 0.056   1.06 0.46 2.44
Osteoporosis, 
age   8 **  55  12  4  *        Bone/Cartil 0.43 1. 1. 2.1 0.497 * 1.64 1.22 2.22
Other 




  0     14  82  0        0.76 2. 0. 5.6 0.586     1.80 0.64 5.04
Iron Deficiency and 
ias   4 **  8  3  0    8  7  Anem 0.82 2.2 1.5 3.4 0.324     1.38 0.8 2.1




ders  6     5  0  *    6  1  r -0.16 0.8 0.6 1.19 0.376  * 1.46 1.0 2.0
Depression  0.110     2  9  4      0  8  1.1 0.3 3.2 -0.117   0.89 0.3 2.6









    0  3  89      1  9  0.179  1.2 0.1 10. 0.906   2.47 0.4 14.9
Seizure Disorders 
  **  3  1  9      2  0  Convulsions 0.847  2.3 1.2 4.4 0.418   1.52 0.7 3.2
Mononeuropathy, 
ogical       9  2  3    6  5  Neurol 0.172  1.1 0.9 1.5 0.110     1.12 0.8 1.4
Unstable Angina, 
ic   *  6  5  2      9  8  Ischem 0.508  1.6 0.9 2.9 0.622 ** 1.86 1.0 3.1
Angina Pectoris/Old 




 **  2  6  3      4  1  0.275 1.3 1.0 1.6 0.142   1.15 0.9 1.4
Unspecified Heart 
  3          Disease  0.120   1.13  0.23  5.6 -0.06   0.94 0.17 5.11
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isease  0.568 **  1 2
Table A1: continued 
 Medicare  admission  Private admission 
Parameter Estimate  Odds    Lower  Upper   Estimate  Odds   Lower   Upper  




- 0.1 0 1 0.170     0.84  0.61  1.18  35     1.15  .85  .55 
Chronic Obstructive 
 Disease  - -0.893 *  0 1 Pulmonary 0.047     0.95  0.43  2.12  0.41  .16  .04 
Asthma  0.135   0.91  1.43  0.140   1.15  0.92  1.44    1.14   
Other Lung 
0.244     1.28  0.89  1.83  -0.228     0.80  0.52  1.21  Disorders 
Glaucoma  0.211     1.23  0.70  2.17  0.020     1.02  0.60  1.74 
Cataract  0.224     1.25  0.85  1.85  0.019     1.02  0.71  1.46 
Other Eye Disorders  -0.243 **  0.78  0.65  0.95  0.040     1.04  0.86  1.26 
Significant Ear, 
Nose, and Throat 
-0.174     0.84  0.27  2.64  -0.775     0.46  0.13  1.62  Disorders 
Hearing Loss  -0.051     0.95  0.77  1.18  0.137     1.15  0.94  1.40 
Other Ear, Nose, 
th Throat, and Mou
Disorders 
 




0.112     1.12  0.75  1.68  0.283     1.33  0.92  1.91 
Incontinence  0.130   1.80  -0 0.93  0.58  1.47    1.14  0.72  .077    
Other Urinary Tract 
0.784 **  3.34  -0 0.92  0.54  1.55  Disorders  2.19  1.44  .086    
Male Genital 





  - 0.438 ** 1.55  1.13  2.13  0.014     0.99  0.69  1.41 
Other Injuries  0.389 **  1.48  1.12  1.94  0.360 **  1.43  1.09  1.89 
Major Symptoms, 




ings  0.059     1.06  0.86  1.31  0.066     1.07  0.87  1.31    
  31
Table A2: Log length  sample 
  ate 
Variabl tim P-value  Es P-value 
I 0.943 0.265 0.0 237 <.0001 




ate  StdErr  timate 
1.102 
Error 
0. 00   
n 0.729 -0.157 0.115 0.171  oins  -0.036 0.103 
dlt1 -0.097  52  0.524  0.030  0.1 -0.335 0.154 
d 0.090 0.154 0.559 -0.071 0.120 0.550  1tolt2 
d 0.245 0.247 0.321 0.234 0.124 0.059  2tolt5 
age30lt40  0.159 0.117 0.173  0.123 0.755  -0.038 
age40lt50  0.079 0.132 0.550  0.132 0.094  -0.222 
age50lt60  0.266 0.146 0.068 0.161 0.152 0.289 
age60lt65  0.218 0.190 0.251  0.181 0.484  -0.126 
age65lt75  0.407 0.181 0.025 -0.180 0.178 0.310 
a 0.001  0.19 0.594  gege75  0.660 0.195  0.103  2 
female 0.095  0.085  0.265 0.113 0.079 0.153 
married 0.089  85  0  0.079 0.280  0.0 .298 -0.085
c 0.099 0.041 0.016  0.04 0.086  hildren  0.072  2 
E -0.031  0.111  0.783 -0.058 0.103 0.576  mployPT 
Unemp  0.41 38 0.081 0.036 0.266 0.893  - 7 0.2
NotinLF  -0.09 11 0.409 0.190 0.103 0.064  2 0.1
stud 0.087 0.128 0.500 0.155 0.136 0.258  y 
i -0.38 59  0 0.004  ncomek  1  0.2 .142  -0.523 0.183 
incuksq 0.091  92  0 0.05 0.001  0.0 .323  0.191  6 
missuinc  -0.10 94 0.258 0.033 0.083 0.689  6 0.0
concard  -0.023 0.110 0.832 -0.095 0.101 0.347 
dvapen -0.547  0.314  0.082 0.115 0.264 0.662 
dvawid 0.602  23  0 0.196 0.396  0.3 .063 0.166 
V 0.048  0.510  IC  0.199 0.100  -0.066 0.100 
QLD  0.169 0.114 0.140  0.106 0.470  -0.077 
S 0.129 0.122 0.290 -0.102 0.120 0.398  A 
W 0.238 0.113 0.035  0.105  A  -0.185 0.114 
TAS  0.145 0.152 0.341 -0.024 0.137 0.864 
NT  -0.139 0.350 0.691 -0.059 0.259 0.819 
ACT  0.279 0.130 0.033 0.143 0.145 0.323 
notcapurban  0.028 0.174 0.872 0.232 0.154 0.131 
otherurban  -0.273 0.083 0.001 -0.025 0.086 0.769 
rural  -0.122 0.104 0.240 -0.013 0.101 0.900 
Other Infectious Diseases  0.384 0.266 0.149 0.675 0.227 0.003 
Breast, Prostate, Colon cancer   -0.256 0.278 0.356 -0.183 0.240 0.447 
Other Neoplasms  0.129 0.183 0.480 0.150 0.177 0.395 
Diabetes No Complications  0.303 0.160 0.058 0.217 0.154 0.160 
Type I Diabetes Mellitus  0.173 0.273 0.527 0.301 0.349 0.389 
Other Endocrine/ Metabolic/  0.145 0.117 0.218 0.035 0.113 0.758 
Peptic Ulcer, Haemorrhage, 
Specified Gastrointestinal   -0.244 0.154 0.114 -0.254 0.145 0.080 
Other Gastrointestinal s  0.119 0.113 0.291 -0.115 0.098 0.241 
Rheumatoid Arthritis,etc 
Connective Tissue Disease  0.008 0.146 0.954 -0.039 0.129 0.764 
Disorders of Vertebrae Spine   -0.319 0.275 0.247 0.483 0.380 0.203 
Osteoporosis Bone/Cartilage   -0.028 0.137 0.837 0.176 0.121 0.146 
Other Musculoskeletal   0.038 0.073 0.605 0.056 0.068 0.413 
Disorders of Immunity  -0.510 0.398 0.201 -0.649 0.408 0.112 
Iron Deficiency and Anaemia   0.384 0.169 0.023 -0.043 0.193 0.823 
    
 






0.35 Drug/Alcoh -0.001   0.998 0.409  8 0.254 
Personality Disorders  -0.063 0.155 0.687 0.230 0.141 0.103 
Depression  0.186 0.518 0.720 0.164 0.476 0.731 
Anxiety Disorders  -0.252 0.149 0.092 -0.053 0.149 0.722 
Other Psychiatric Disorders  0.174 0.133 0.190 -0.022 0.136 0.874 
Developmental Disability  -0.156 0.924 0.866 -0.951 0.641 0.138 
Seizure Convulsions  -0.027 0.252 0.914 -0.156 0.314 0.618 
Mononeuropathy, Neurological   -0.105 0.122 0.388 0.034 0.117 0.773 
Unstable Angina and Ischemic   -0.258 0.229 0.260 0.167 0.201 0.408 
Angina Pectoris/Old MCI   -0.159 0.175 0.363 0.074 0.178 0.678 
Hypertensive Heart Disease  0.149 0.094 0.116 -0.128 0.088 0.143 
Other and Unspecified Heart 
Disease  -0.815 0.936 0.385 -0.850 0.644 0.188 
Cerebrovascular Unspecified  0.260 0.144 0.072 0.125 0.143 0.381 
Vascular Disease  0.107 0.187 0.566 -0.100 0.182 0.581 
Other Circulatory Disease  0.052 0.146 0.724 0.292 0.128 0.023 
COPD  0.242 0.311 0.437 -0.170 0.379 0.654 
Asthma  -0.072 0.102 0.476 0.236 0.101 0.019 
Other Lung Disorders  -0.023 0.163 0.886 -0.286 0.189 0.130 
Glaucoma  -0.038 0.237 0.871 0.197 0.229 0.390 
Cataract  -0.117 0.172 0.496 -0.143 0.152 0.350 
Other Eye Disorders  -0.004 0.086 0.965 0.188 0.089 0.035 
Significant Ear, Nose, Throat   -1.311 0.497 0.009 1.518 0.645 0.019 
Hearing Loss  -0.049 0.098 0.620 -0.063 0.085 0.455 
Other Ear, Nose, Throat Mouth   -0.046 0.073 0.526 -0.187 0.070 0.008 
Urinary Obstruction n  0.098 0.174 0.574 -0.165 0.160 0.304 
Incontinence  -0.211 0.199 0.288 0.167 0.195 0.393 
Other Urinary Tract Disorders  -0.362 0.180 0.045 0.469 0.226 0.038 
Male Genital Disorders  -0.254 0.922 0.783 -0.221 0.388 0.569 
Other Dermatological   0.003 0.150 0.985 -0.001 0.153 0.996 
Other Injuries  0.103 0.122 0.399 -0.051 0.120 0.673 
Major Abnormalities  -0.183 0.468 0.696 0.663 0.678 0.329 
Minor Symptoms, Signs,   -0.083 0.097 0.391 -0.062 0.089 0.485 
verygood -0.199  0.113  0.079  -0.046  0.107  0.668 
good  -0.137 0.118 0.249 0.071 0.106 0.505 
fair -0.248  0.132  0.060  0.329 0.121 0.007 
poor  0.215 0.158 0.174 0.288 0.160 0.073 
thin  0.207 0.132 0.118 0.106 0.130 0.417 
overweight -0.082  0.082 0.319 0.101 0.077 0.189 
obese  -0.189 0.093 0.042 0.082 0.096 0.397 
missbmi -0.081  0.134  0.547  0.293 0.140 0.037 
Smoke  -0.024 0.092 0.794 -0.174 0.098 0.076 
drinks 0.003  0.013  0.804  -0.045 0.020 0.023 
exhigh  -0.142 0.180 0.429 0.052 0.159 0.746 
exmod  -0.154 0.088 0.080 0.017 0.085 0.843 
exsed  -0.246 0.257 0.339 0.423 0.266 0.113 
exno  -0.027 0.079 0.729 0.008 0.077 0.921 
tertiary -0.047  0.109 0.669 0.107 0.098 0.271 
diploma  -0.205 0.110 0.063 0.137 0.105 0.192 
otherqual -0.086  0.083 0.301 0.043 0.082 0.599 
missqual 0.227  0.176  0.197 -0.363 0.209 0.083 
bornaust  0.176 0.080 0.029 -0.085 0.076 0.264 
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